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TROPICAL LINEAR-FRACTIONAL PROGRAMMING AND PARAMETRIC
MEAN PAYOFF GAMES
STE´PHANE GAUBERT, RICARDO D. KATZ, AND SERGEI˘ SERGEEV
Abstract. Tropical polyhedra have been recently used to represent disjunctive invariants in static
analysis. To handle larger instances, tropical analogues of classical linear programming results
need to be developed. This motivation leads us to study the tropical analogue of the classical
linear-fractional programming problem. We construct an associated parametric mean payoff game
problem, and show that the optimality of a given point, or the unboundedness of the problem, can
be certified by exhibiting a strategy for one of the players having certain infinitesimal properties
(involving the value of the game and its derivative) that we characterize combinatorially. We use this
idea to design a Newton-like algorithm to solve tropical linear-fractional programming problems,
by reduction to a sequence of auxiliary mean payoff game problems.
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation from static analysis. Tropical algebra is the structure in which the set of real
numbers, completed with −∞, is equipped with the “additive” law “a+b” := a∨b = max(a, b) and
the “multiplicative” law “ab” := a+b. The max-plus or tropical analogues of convex sets have been
studied by a number of authors [Zim77, CG79, GP97, LMS01, CGQ04, DS04, BH04, Jos05], under
various names (idempotent spaces, semimodules, B-convexity, extremal convexity), with different
degrees of generality, and various motivations.
In the recent work [AGG08], Allamigeon, Gaubert and Goubault have used tropical polyhedra
to compute disjunctive invariants in static analysis. A general (affine) tropical polyhedron can be
represented as
P := {x ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n |
(
∨
j∈[n]
(aij + xj)
)
∨ ci ≤
(
∨
j∈[n]
(bij + xj)
)
∨ di,∀i ∈ [m]}.(1)
Here, we use the notation [n] := {1, . . . , n}, and the parameters aij, bij, ci and di are given,
with values in R ∪ {−∞}. The analogy with classical polyhedra becomes clearer with the tropical
notation, which allows us to write the constraints as “Ax + c ≤ Bx + d”, to be compared with
classical systems of linear inequalities, Ax ≤ d (in the tropical setting, we need to consider affine
functions on both sides of the inequality due to the absence of opposite law for addition). The
previous representation of P is the analogue of the external representation of polyhedra, as the
intersection of half-spaces. As in the classical case, tropical polyhedra have a dual (internal)
representation, which involves extreme points and extreme rays. The tropical analogue of Motzkin
double description method allows one to pass from one representation to the other [AGG10b].
Disjunctive invariants arise naturally when analyzing sorting algorithms or in the verification of
string manipulation programs. The well known memcpy function of C is discussed in [AGG08] as
a simple illustration: when copying the first n characters of a string buffer src to a string buffer
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dst, the length len dst of the latter buffer may differ from the length len src of the former, for
if n is smaller than len src, the null terminal character of the buffer src is not copied. However,
the relation min(len src, n) = min(len dst, n) is valid. This can be expressed geometrically by
saying that the vector (−len src,−len dst) belongs to a tropical polyhedron. Several examples
of programs of a disjunctive nature, which are analyzed by means of tropical polyhedra, can be
found in [AGG08, All09], in which the tropical analogue of the classical polyhedra-based abstract
interpretation method of [CH78] has been developed.
The comparative interest of tropical polyhedra is illustrated in Figure 1, which gives a sim-
ple fragment of code in which the tropical invariant is tighter. Note that there is still an over-
approximation in the tropical case, because the transfer function considered here is discontinuous
(tropical polyhedra share with classical polyhedra the property of being connected, and therefore
cannot represent exactly such discontinuities). Such tropical invariants can be obtained auto-
matically via the methods of [AGG08, All09], which rely on the tropical analogue of the double
description algorithm [AGG10b], allowing one to obtain the vertices of a tropical polyhedron from
a family of defining inequalities, and vice versa.
As in the case of classical polyhedra, the scalability of the approach is inherently limited by the
exponential blow up of the size of representations of polyhedra, since the number of vertices or of
defining inequalities can be exponential in the size of the input data [AGK11a, AGK11b].
The complexity of earlier polyhedral approaches led Sankaranarayanan, Colon, Sipma and Manna
to introduce the method of templates [SSM05, SCSM06]. In a nutshell, a template consists of a
finite set T = {g1, . . . , gm} of linear forms on R
n. The latter define a parametric family of polyhedra
Pα = {x ∈ R
n | gk(x) ≤ αk , k ∈ [m]}
with precisely m degrees of freedom α1, . . . , αm ∈ R ∪ {+∞}. The classical domains of boxes or
the domain of zones (potential constraints) [Min04] are recovered by incorporating in the template
the linear forms g(x) = ±xi or g(x) = xi − xj , respectively. Fixing the template, or changing it
dynamically while keeping m bounded, avoids the exponential blow up.
The method of [SCSM06] relies critically on linear programming, which allows one to evaluate
quickly the fixed point functional of abstract interpretation. However, the precision of the invariants
remains limited by the linear nature of templates, and it is natural to ask whether the machinery
of templates carries over to the non-linear case.
The formalism of templates has been extended to the non-linear case by Adje´, Gaubert and
Goubault [AGG10a], who considered specially quadratic templates, the linear programming meth-
ods of [SCSM06] being replaced by semidefinite programming, thanks to Shor’s relaxation. More
generally, every tractable subclass of optimization problems yields a tractable template.
In order to compute disjunctive invariants, Allamigeon, Gaubert and Goubault suggested to
develop a generalization of the template method to the case of tropical polyhedra. As a preliminary
step, the relevant results of linear programming must be tropicalized: this is the object of the present
paper.
In particular, comparing the expressions of P and Pα, we see that the classical linear forms must
now be replaced by the differences of tropical affine forms
g(x) =
(
∨
j∈[n]
(pj + xj) ∨ r
)
−
(
∨
j∈[n]
(qj + xj) ∨ s
)
(2)
where pj, r, qj and s are given parameters with values in R ∪ {−∞}.
1.2. The problem. In this paper, we study the following tropical linear-fractional programming
problem:
minimize g(x)
subject to: x ∈ P
(3)
2
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Figure 1. The tropical polyhedral abstraction of a transfer function, follow-
ing [AGG08], versus the classical polyhedral abstraction. The optimal invariant
is represented by the union of two half-lines. The tropical over-approximation of
this behavior (union of the triangle in dark gray and of the half-lines, left) is more
accurate than the classical polyhedral one (cone in light gray, right).
where P is given by (1) and g is given by (2). This is the tropical analogue of the classical linear-
fractional programming problem
minimize (px+ r)/(qx+ s)
subject to: Ax+ c ≤ Bx+ d , x ≥ 0 , x ∈ Rn
where p, q are nonnegative vectors, r, s are nonnegative scalars, and A, B, c, d are matrices and
vectors. The constraint “x ≥ 0” is implicit in (3), since any number is “nonnegative” (i.e. ≥ −∞)
in the tropical world.
Problem (3) includes as special cases
g(x) = ∨
j∈[n]
(pj + xj) and g(x) = − ∨
j∈[n]
(qj + xj)(4)
(take qj ≡ −∞, r = −∞ and s = 0, or pj ≡ −∞, s = −∞ and r = 0). According to the terminology
of [BA08], the latter may be thought of as the tropical analogues of the linear programming problem.
However, optimizing the more general fractional objective function (2) appears to be needed in a
number of basic applications. In particular, in static analysis, we need typically to compute the
tightest inequality of the form xi ≤ K + xj satisfied by the elements of P . This fits in the general
form (2), but not in the special cases (4).
1.3. Contribution. A basic question in linear programming is to certify the optimality of a given
point. This is classically done by exhibiting a feasible solution of the dual problem (i.e. a vector of
Lagrange multipliers) with the same value. There is no such a simple result in the tropical setting,
because as remarked in [GK09], there are (tropically linear) inequalities which can be logically
deduced from some finite system of (tropically linear) inequalities but which cannot be obtained
by taking (tropical) linear combinations of the inequalities of the system. In other words, the
usual statement of Farkas lemma is not valid in the tropical setting. However, recently Allamigeon,
Gaubert and Katz [AGK11b] established a tropical analogue of Farkas lemma, building on [AGG09],
in which Lagrange multipliers are replaced by strategies of an associated mean payoff game. We
use the same idea here, and show in Subsection 3.3 (Theorem 12 below) that the optimality of a
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solution can be (concisely) certified by exhibiting a strategy of a game, having certain combinatorial
properties. Similarly, whether the value of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem is
unbounded can also be certified in terms of strategies (Theorem 13).
The second ingredient is to think of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem as a
parametric mean payoff game problem. Then, the tropical linear-fractional programming problem
reduces to the computation of the minimal parameter for which the value of the game is nonnegative.
As a function of the parameter, this value is piecewise-linear and 1-Lipschitz, see Subsection 3.2
for a more detailed description.
The main contribution of this paper is a Newton-like method, where at each iteration we select
a strategy playing the role of derivative (whose existence is implied by the fact that the current
feasible point is not optimal). This defines a one player parametric game problem, and we show
that the smallest value of the parameter making the value zero can be computed in polynomial
time for this subgame, by means of shortest path algorithms as described in Subsection 3.5. The
master algorithm (Algorithm 2) requires solving at each iteration an auxiliary mean payoff game,
see Subsections 3.6 and 3.7. Mean payoff games can be solved either by value iteration, which is
pseudo-polynomial, or by policy iteration, for which exponential time instances have been recently
constructed in [Fri09], although the algorithm is fast on typical examples. The number of New-
ton type iterations of the Newton-like algorithm has a trivial exponential bound (the number of
strategies), and we show that the algorithm is pseudo-polynomial, see Theorem 19. Although this
algorithm seems to behave well on typical examples, see in particular Subsection 4.1, some further
work would be needed to assess its worst case complexity (its behavior is likely to be similar to the
one of policy iteration, see Subsection 4.3 for a preliminary account of numerical experiments).
1.4. Related work. Butkovicˇ and Aminu [BA08] studied the special cases (4), see also [But10,
Chapter 10]. At each iteration, they solve a feasibility problem (whether a tropical polyhedron is
non-empty), which is equivalent to checking whether a mean payoff game is winning for one of the
players. However, their algorithm does not involve a Newton-like iteration, but rather a dichotomy
argument. In [BA08] the number of calls to a mean payoff oracle, whose implementation relies on
the alternating method of [CGB03], depends on the size of the integers in the input, whereas the
number of calls in the present algorithm can be bounded independently of these, just in terms of
strategies.
A different approach to tropical linear programming was developed previously in the works of U.
Zimmermann [Zim81] and K. Zimmermann [Zim05]. This approach, which is based on residuation
theory, and works over more general idempotent semirings, identifies important special cases in
which the solution can be obtained explicitly (and often, in linear time). However, it cannot
be applied to our more general formulation, in which there is little hope to find similar explicit
solutions.
Newton methods for finding the least fixed point of nonlinear functions are also closely related
to this paper. Such methods were developed in [CGG+05, GGTZ07, GS07] to solve monotone fixed
point problems arising in abstract interpretation. Esparza et al. [EGKS08] develop such methods
for monotone systems of min-max-polynomial equations. They seek for the least fixed point of a
function whose components are max-polynomials or min-polynomials, showing that their Newton
methods have linear convergence at least. The class of functions considered there is considerably
more general than the tropical linear forms appearing here, but the fixed point problems considered
in [EGKS08] appear to be of a different nature. It would be interesting, however, to connect the
two approaches.
1.5. Further motivation. Tropical polyhedra have been used in [Kat07] to determine invariants
of discrete event systems. Systems of constraints equivalent to the ones defining tropical polyhedra
have also appeared in the analysis of delays in digital circuits, and in the study of scheduling
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problems with both “and” and “or” constraints [MSS04]. Such systems have been studied by
Bezem, Nieuwenhuis, and Rodr´ıguez-Carbonell [BNRC08, BNRC10], under the name of the “max-
atom problem”. The latter is motivated by SAT Modulo theory solving, since conjunctions of max-
atoms determine a remarkable fragment of linear arithmetic. Tropical polyhedra also turn out to
be interesting mathematical objects in their own right [DS04, Jos05]. A final motivation arises from
mean payoff games, the complexity of which is a well known open problem: a series of works show
that a number of problems which can be expressed in terms of tropical polyhedra are polynomial
time equivalent to mean payoff games problems [MSS04, DG06, AGG09, BNRC10, AGK11b].
The results of the present paper rely on [AGG09, AGK11b].
2. Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some definitions and results needed to describe the present tropical
linear-fractional programming algorithm.
We start by introducing deterministic mean payoff games played on a finite bipartite digraph,
see Subsection 2.1. We then summarize some elements of the operator approach to such games,
in including a theorem of [Koh80], Theorem 2 below, implying that their dynamic programming
operators f have invariant half-lines (χ, v). These invariant half-lines determine the ultimate growth
of the orbits fk(x)/k, known as the cycle-time vector χ(f) of f . They also determine a pair of
optimal strategies, and the winning nodes of the players ({i | χi(f) ≥ 0} and {i | χi(f) < 0}) in
the associated game.
Then, we recall in Subsection 2.2 the correspondence between tropical polyhedra and mean
payoff games, along the lines of [AGG09]: Theorem 5 shows that i is a winning node (χi(f) ≥ 0)
if, and only if, the associated tropical two-sided system of inequalities has a solution x whose ith
coordinate is finite (xi 6= −∞). We also recall the max-plus and min-plus representations of min-
max functions, together with the combinatorial characterization, in terms of maximal or minimal
cycle means, of the cycle time vector for one-player games. This will be used to construct optimality
and unboundedness certificates in Subsection 3.3.
2.1. Mean payoff games and min-max functions. Consider a two-player deterministic game
where the players, called “Max” and “Min”, make alternate moves of a pawn on a weighted bipartite
digraph G. The set of nodes of G is the disjoint union of the nodes [m] where Max is active, and
the nodes [n] where Min is active. When the pawn is in node k ∈ [m] of Max, he must choose an
arc in G connecting node k with some node l ∈ [n] of Min, and while moving the pawn along this
arc, he receives the weight bkl of the selected arc as payment from Min. When the pawn is in node
j ∈ [n] of Min, she must choose an arc in G connecting node j with some node i ∈ [m] of Max,
and pays −aij to Max, where −aij is the weight of the selected arc. We assume that bkl, aij ∈ R.
Moreover, certain moves may be prohibited, meaning that the corresponding arcs are not present
in G. Then, we set bkl = −∞ and aij = −∞. Thus, the whole game is equivalently defined by
two m × n matrices A = (aij) and B = (bkl) with entries in R ∪ {−∞}. We make the following
assumptions, which assure that both players have at least one move allowed in each node.
Assumption 1. For all k ∈ [m] there exists l ∈ [n] such that bkl 6= −∞.
Assumption 2. For all j ∈ [n] there exists i ∈ [m] such that aij 6= −∞.
A general strategy for a player (Max or Min) is a function that for every finite history of a play
ending at some node selects a successor of this node (i.e., a move of the player). A positional
strategy for a player is a function that selects a unique successor of every node independently of the
history of the play.
A strategy for player Max will be usually denoted by σ and a strategy for player Min by τ .
Thus, a positional strategy for player Max is a function σ : [m] 7→ [n] such that biσ(i) is finite for all
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i ∈ [m], and a positional strategy for player Min is a function τ : [n] 7→ [m] such that aτ(j)j is finite
for all j ∈ [n].
When player Max reveals his positional strategy σ, the play proceeds within the digraph Gσ
where at each node i of Max all but one arc (i, σ(i)) are removed. When player Min reveals her
positional strategy τ , the play proceeds within the digraph Gτ where at each node j of Min all but
one arc (j, τ(j)) are removed.
When player Max reveals his positional strategy σ and player Min her positional strategy τ ,
the play proceeds within the digraph Gσ,τ where each node has a unique outgoing arc (i, σ(i)) or
(j, τ(j)). Thus, Gσ,τ is a “sunflower” digraph, i.e., such that each node has a unique path to a
unique cycle.
The infinite horizon version of this mean payoff game starts at a node j of Min1 and proceeds
according to the strategies (not necessarily positional) of the players, who are interested in the
value of average payment. More precisely, player Min wants to minimize
ΦsupA,B(j, τ, σ) := lim sup
k→∞
(
k∑
t=1
−aitjt−1 + bitjt)/k , j0 = j ,
while player Max wants to maximize
ΦinfA,B(j, τ, σ) := lim inf
k→∞
(
k∑
t=1
−aitjt−1 + bitjt)/k , j0 = j ,
where j1 ∈ [n], i1 ∈ [m], j2 ∈ [n], i2 ∈ [m], . . . is the infinite sequence of positions of the pawn
resulting from the selected strategies τ and σ of the players. The next theorem shows that this game
has a value. An analogue of this theorem concerning stochastic games was obtained by [LL69].
Theorem 1 ([EM79, GKK88]). For the mean payoff game whose payments are given by the matrices
A,B ∈ (R∪{−∞})m×n, where A,B satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, there exists a vector χ ∈ Rn and
a pair of positional strategies σ∗ and τ∗ such that
(i) ΦsupA,B(j, τ
∗, σ) ≤ χj for all (not necessarily positional) strategies σ,
(ii) ΦinfA,B(j, τ, σ
∗) ≥ χj for all (not necessarily positional) strategies τ ,
for all nodes j of Min.
In other words, player Max has a positional strategy σ∗ which secures a mean profit of at least χj
whatever is the strategy of player Min, and player Min has a positional strategy τ∗ which secures
a mean loss of no more than χj whatever player Max does.
A finite duration version of the mean payoff game considered above can be also formulated.
Again, it starts at a certain node j of Min and proceeds according to the strategies of the players
(not necessarily positional), but stops immediately when a cycle j0 ∈ [m]→ i1 ∈ [n]→ j1 ∈ [m]→
· · · → ik ∈ [n] → jk = j0 is formed. Then, the outcome of the game is the mean weight per turn
(so the length of a cycle may be seen as the number of nodes of Max or Min it contains) of that
cycle:
(5) ΦA,B(j, τ, σ) := (
k∑
t=1
−aitjt−1 + bitjt)/k .
The ambition of Max is to maximize ΦA,B(j, τ, σ) while Min is seeking to minimize it.
It was shown in [EM79, Theorem 2] that this finite duration version of the game has the same
value as the infinite horizon version described above, and that there are positional optimal strategies
1The game can start also at a node i of Max, the requirement to be started by Min is for better consistency with
min-max functions and two-sided tropical systems, see (7) and (14).
6
which secure this value for both versions of the game. It follows by standard arguments that χj is
determined uniquely by
(6) χj = ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ∗) = min
τ
max
σ
ΦA,B(j, τ, σ) = max
σ
min
τ
ΦA,B(j, τ, σ) ,
where τ and σ range over the sets of all strategies (not necessarily positional) for players Min and
Max, respectively.
The dynamic programming operator f : Rn 7→ Rn associated with the infinite horizon mean
payoff game is defined by:
(7) fj(x) = ∧
k∈[m]
(−akj + ∨
l∈[n]
(bkl + xl)) .
This function, combining min-plus and max-plus linearity (see below in Subsection 2.2), is known
as a min-max function [CTGG99]. Min-max functions are isotone (x ≤ y ⇒ f(x) ≤ f(y)) and
additively homogeneous (f(λ + x) = λ + f(x)). Hence, they are nonexpansive in the sup-norm.
Moreover, they are piecewise affine (Rn can be covered by a finite number of polyhedra on which
f is affine). We are interested in the following limit (cycle-time vector):
(8) χ(f) = lim
k→∞
fk(x)/k .
The jth entry of the vector χ(f) can be interpreted as the limit of the mean value of the game per
turn, as the horizon k tends to infinity, when the starting node is j. The existence of χ(f) follows
from a theorem of Kohlberg.
Theorem 2 ([Koh80]). Let f : Rn 7→ Rn be a nonexpansive and piecewise affine function. Then,
there exist v ∈ Rn and χ ∈ Rn such that
f(v + tχ) = v + (t+ 1)χ , ∀t ≥ T ,
where T is a large enough real number.
The function t 7→ v + tχ is known as an invariant half-line. Using the nonexpansiveness of f ,
one deduces that the limit (8) exists, is the same for all x ∈ Rn and is equal to the growth rate χ
of any invariant half-line.
Given fixed positional strategies τ and σ for players Min and Max, respectively, we can consider
the dynamic operators corresponding to the partial digraphs Gτ and Gσ. These operators are
max-only and min-only functions:
f τj (x) = −aτ(j)j + ∨
l∈[n]
(bτ(j)l + xl) ,
fσj (x) = ∧
i∈[m]
(−aij + biσ(i) + xσ(i)) .
(9)
They are the main subject of tropical linear algebra, see Subsection 2.2, where in particular we
recall how their cycle-time vectors can be computed. Theorem 10 below relates these cycle-time
vectors with the cycle time vector of the min-max function (7).
The following result can be derived as a standard corollary of Kohlberg’s theorem. Indeed, we
define a positional strategy τ of Min and a positional strategy σ of Max by the condition that
f(v + tχ) = fσ(v + tχ) = f τ (v + tχ) for t large enough, where t 7→ v + tχ is an invariant half-line.
These strategies are easily seen to be optimal for the mean payoff game.
Theorem 3 (Coro. of [Koh80]). For f(x) given by (7), the jth coordinate of χ(f) is the value of
the mean payoff game which starts at node j of Min.
In what follows, we shall use the following form of the value existence result (6), which was proved
in [GG98] as a corollary of the termination of the policy iteration algorithm of [GG98, CTGG99],
see [DG06] for a more recent presentation. Alternatively, it can be quickly derived from [Koh80]
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(the derivation can be found in [AGG09, Theorem 2.13]). This result has been known as the
“duality theorem” in the discrete event systems literature.
Theorem 4 (Coro. of [Koh80], [GG98]). Let A,B ∈ (R∪{−∞})m×n satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2,
and let S and T be the sets of all positional strategies for players Max and Min, respectively. Then,
(10) max
σ∈S
χ(fσ) = χ(f) = min
τ∈T
χ(f τ ) .
This characterization of χ(f) should be compared with (6). The latter shows that the infinite
horizon version of the game with limsup/liminf payoff has a value, whereas (10) concerns the limit
of the value of the finite horizon version. Thus, in loose terms, the “limit” and “value” operations
commute.
2.2. Tropical linear systems and mean payoff games. Max-only and min-only functions of the
form (9) belong to tropical linear algebra. Max-only functions are linear in the max-plus semiring
Rmax, which is the set R ∪ {−∞} equipped with the operations of “addition” “a+ b” := a ∨ b and
“multiplication” “ab” := a+ b. For min-only functions, we use the min-plus semiring Rmin, i.e. the
set R∪{+∞} equipped with the operations of “addition” “a+ b” := a∧ b and the same “additive”
multiplication. The setting in which both structures are considered simultaneously has been called
minimax algebra in [CG79]. Then, we need to allow the scalars to belong to the enlarged set
R := R ∪ {−∞} ∪ {+∞}. Note that in R, (−∞) + (+∞) = −∞ if the max-plus convention is
considered and (−∞) + (+∞) = +∞ if the min-plus convention is considered.
The tropical operations are extended to matrices and vectors in the usual way. In particular, for
any matrix E = (eij) and any vector x of compatible dimensions:
(11) “(Ex)i” = ∨
j
eij + xj (max-plus) , “(Ex)i” = ∧
j
eij + xj (min-plus) .
Max-plus and min-plus linear functions are mutually adjoint, or residuated. Recall that for a max-
plus linear function from R
n
to R
m
, given by E ∈ Rm×nmax , the residuated operator E
♯ from R
m
to
R
n
is defined by
(12) (E♯y)j := ∧
i∈[m]
(−eij + yi) ,
with the convention (−∞) + (+∞) = +∞. Note that this residuated operator, also known as
Cuninghame-Green inverse, is given by the multiplication of −ET by y with the min-plus operations
(here ET denotes the transposed of E), and that it sends Rmmax to R
n
max whenever E does not have
columns identically equal to −∞.
In what follows, concatenations such as Ex should be understood as the multiplication of E
by x with the max-plus operations, and concatenations such as E♯y should be understood as the
multiplication of −ET by y with the min-plus operations (and the corresponding conventions for
(−∞) + (+∞)).
The term “residuated” refers to the property
(13) Ex ≤ y ⇔ x ≤ E♯y ,
where ≤ is the partial order on Rmmax or R
n
max, which can be deduced from
eij + xj ≤ yi ∀i, j ⇔ xj ≤ −eij + yi ∀i, j .
As a consequence, the residuated operator is crucial for max-plus two-sided systems of inequalities,
because (13) implies:
(14) Ax ≤ Bx⇔ x ≤ A♯Bx .
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Writing the last inequality explicitly, we have
(15) xj ≤ ∧
k∈[m]
(−akj + ∨
l∈[n]
(bkl + xl)) , ∀j ∈ [n] .
Thus, we obtain the same min-max function as in (7).
Moreover, positional strategies σ : [m] 7→ [n] and τ : [n] 7→ [m] correspond to affine functions Bσ
and Aτ defined by
(16) (Aτ )ij =
{
aij if i = τ(j),
−∞ otherwise,
(Bσ)ij =
{
bij if j = σ(i),
−∞ otherwise.
Recasting (10) in max(min)-plus algebra, we obtain
(17) max
σ∈S
χ(A♯Bσ) = χ(A♯B) = min
τ∈T
χ(A♯τB) .
The following result, obtained by Akian, Gaubert and Guterman, relates solutions of Ax ≤ Bx
and nonnegative coordinates of χ(A♯B). These coordinates correspond to winning nodes of the
mean payoff game: if the game starts in these nodes, then Max can ensure nonnegative profit with
any strategy of Min.
Theorem 5 ([AGG09, Th. 3.2]). Let A,B ∈ Rm×nmax satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then, χi(A
♯B) ≥
0 if and only if there exists x ∈ Rnmax such that Ax ≤ Bx and xi 6= −∞.
This is derived in [AGG09] from Kohlberg’s theorem. The vector x is constructed by taking an
invariant half-line, t 7→ v + tχ, setting xi = vi + tχi for t large enough if χi ≥ 0, and xi = −∞
otherwise.
Theorem 5 shows that to decide whether Ax ≤ Bx can be satisfied by a vector x such that
xi 6= −∞, we can exploit a mean payoff oracle, which decides whether i is a winning node of the
associated mean payoff game and gives a winning strategy for player Max. This oracle can be
implemented either by using the value iteration method, which is pseudo-polynomial [ZP96], by
the approach of Puri (solving an associated discounted game for a discount factor close enough to
1 by policy iteration [Pur95]), by using the policy iteration algorithm for mean payoff games of
[CTGG99, GG98, DG06], or the one of [BV07].
In tropical linear algebra, there is no obvious subtraction. However, for any E ∈ R
n×n
we can
define the Kleene star
(18) E∗ := “(I − E)−1” = I ∨E ∨ E2 ∨ · · · (max-plus) ,
and analogously with ∧ in the min-plus case. In (18), I is the max-plus identity matrix with
0 entries on the main diagonal and −∞ off the diagonal, and the powers are understood in the
tropical (max-plus) sense. Due to the order completeness of R, the series in (18) is well-defined for
all matrices. Note that in R
n×n
, X = E∗ is a solution of the matrix Bellman equation X = EX ∨I.
Similarly, x = E∗h is a solution of x = Ex ∨ h. Indeed, if z ≥ Ez ∨ h, then we also have
z ≥ Ez ∨ h ≥ E2z ∨ Eh ∨ h ≥ · · · ≥ Ek+1z ∨ Ekh ∨ Ek−1h ∨ · · · ∨ h ,
so that z ≥ E∗h for all such z. We sum this up in the following standard proposition.
Proposition 6 (See e.g. [BCOQ92, Th. 3.17]). Let E ∈ R
n×n
and h ∈ R
n
. Then, E∗h is the least
solution of z ≥ Ez ∨ h.
For E ∈ R
n×n
, consider the associated digraph D(E), with set of nodes [n] and an arc connecting
node i with node j whenever eij is finite, in which case eij is the weight of this arc. We shall say
that node i accesses node j if there exists a path from i to j in D(E).
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The maximal (minimal) cycle mean is another important object of tropical algebra. For E ∈
R
n×n
max (E ∈ R
n×n
min ), it is defined as
µmax(E) = max
k∈[n]
max
i1,...,ik
ei1i2 + · · ·+ eiki1
k
(max-plus) ,
µmin(E) = min
k∈[n]
min
i1,...,ik
ei1i2 + · · · + eiki1
k
(min-plus) .
(19)
Denote by µmaxi (E) (µ
min
i (E)) the maximal (minimal) cycle mean of the strongly connected com-
ponent of D(E) to which i belongs. These numbers are given by the same expressions as in (19),
but with i1, . . . , ik restricted to that strongly connected component. Using µ
max
i (E) (µ
min
i (E)), we
can write explicit expressions for the cycle-time vector of a max-plus (min-plus) linear function
x 7→ Ex:
χmaxi (E) = max{µ
max
j (E) | i accesses j} (max-plus),
χmini (E) = min{µ
min
j (E) | i accesses j} (min-plus).
(20)
See [CTCG+98] or [HOvdW05] for proofs. Importantly, these cycle-time vectors of max-plus and
min-plus linear functions appear in (10).
Finally, note that (19) and (20) can be deduced from (6) if σ or τ is fixed.
Remark 1. Observe that any entry (i, j) of Ek in max-plus (resp. min-plus) algebra expresses the
maximal (resp. minimal) weight of paths with k arcs connecting node i with node j in D(E). It
follows then from (18) that any entry (i, j) of E∗, for i 6= j, expresses the maximal (or minimal)
weight of paths connecting node i with node j without restrictions on the number of arcs. Further
we can add to D(E) a new node and, whenever bi if finite, an arc of weight bi connecting node
i of D(E) with this new node. Then, (E∗b)i provides the maximal (or minimal) weight of paths
connecting node i with the new node. Therefore, computing E∗b is equivalent to solving a single
destination shortest path problem, which can be done in O(n3) time (for instance by the Bellman-
Ford algorithm).
Remark 2. We note that χmax(E) and χmin(E) can also be computed in O(n3) time. To do this,
decompose first the digraph D(E) in strongly connected components, and apply Karp’s algorithm to
compute the maximal or minimal cycle mean of each component.
3. Tropical linear-fractional programming
This is the main section of the paper. Here we solve the tropical linear-fractional programming
problem (3), i.e. the problem
minimize (px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s)
subject to: Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d , x ∈ Rnmax
(21)
where p, q ∈ Rnmax, c, d ∈ R
m
max, r, s ∈ Rmax and A,B ∈ R
m×n
max .
In Subsection 3.1, we apply Theorem 5 to reduce (21) to the problem of finding the smallest zero
of a function giving the value of a parametric game (the spectral function).
In Subsection 3.2, we show that the spectral function is 1-Lipschitz and piecewise linear, and
that it can be written as a finite supremum or infimum of partial spectral functions, corresponding
to one player games. We also prove a number of technical statements about the piecewise-linear
structure of the spectral functions, which will be used in the complexity analysis.
In Subsection 3.3, we provide certificates of optimality and unboundedness (these certificates
are given by strategies for the players). This generalizes the result of [AGK11b], concerning the
tropical analogue of Farkas lemma. We recover as a special case the unboundedness certificates
of [BA08].
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The rest of the section is devoted to finding the least zero of the spectral function. With this
aim, we introduce a bisection method, as well as a Newton-type method, in which partial spectral
functions play the role of derivatives, see Subsection 3.4.
Each Newton iteration consists of
(i) Computing a derivative, i.e. choosing a strategy for player Max (or dually Min) which satisfies
a local optimality condition;
(ii) Finding the smallest zero of the tangent map, which represents the parametric spectral func-
tion of a one-player game in which the strategy for player Max (or dually Min) is already
fixed.
The iteration in the space of strategies for player Max has an advantage: the second subproblem
can be reduced to a shortest-path problem (Subsection 3.5). The first subproblem is discussed in
Subsection 3.6, where the overall worst-case complexity of Newton method is given. Subsection 3.7,
which can be skipped by the reader, gives an alternative approach to the first subproblem in which
the computation of (left) optimal strategies is rather algebraic and not relying on the integrality.
3.1. The spectral function method. In this subsection we recast (21) as a parametric two-sided
tropical system and a mean payoff game, introducing the key concept of spectral function. However,
before doing this we need to mention special cases in which there exists a feasible x (i.e., satisfying
Ax∨ c ≤ Bx∨ d) such that px∨ r = −∞ or qx∨ s = −∞. For these cases we assume the following
rules:
(22)
px ∨ r qx ∨ s (px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s)
−∞ finite −∞
finite −∞ +∞
−∞ −∞ −∞
which are formally consistent with the rules of Rmax. Then, it is easy to check that
(23) (px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s) = min{λ ∈ Rmax | px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s)} .
Introducing the notation
(24) U =
(
A c
p r
)
and V (λ) =
(
B d
λ+ q λ+ s
)
,
we reformulate the tropical linear-fractional programming problem in terms of a spectral function,
which gives the value of a parametric mean payoff game: the payments are given by the matrices
U and V (λ), and the initial node is n+ 1.
Proposition-Definition 7. With assumption (22), the tropical linear-fractional programming
problem (21) is equivalent to
(25) min{λ ∈ Rmax | φ(λ) ≥ 0}
where the spectral function φ is given by
φ(λ) := χn+1(U
♯V (λ)) .
Proof. We first show that (21) is equivalent to the following problem:
minimize λ
subject to: px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s) , Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d , x ∈ Rnmax , λ ∈ Rmax
(26)
Indeed, denoting P = {x ∈ Rnmax | Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d}, we verify that
min
x∈P
{(px ∨ r)− (qx ∨ s)} =min
x∈P
min
λ
{λ | px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s)}
=min
λ
{∃x ∈ P | px ∨ r ≤ λ+ (qx ∨ s)} .
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Every problem concerning affine polyhedra has an equivalent “homogeneous” version concerning
cones, which is obtained by adding to the system of inequalities defining an affine polyhedron a
new variable whose coefficients are the free terms of this system. Then, the original polyhedron is
recovered by setting this new variable to 0. The homogeneous equivalent version of (26) reads:
minimize λ
subject to: uy ≤ λ+ vy , Cy ≤ Dy , yn+1 6= −∞ , y ∈ R
n+1
max , λ ∈ Rmax
(27)
where we set u = [p, r], v = [q, s], C = [A, c] and D = [B, d].
We can still reformulate (27) in a more compact way:
min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V (λ)y , yn+1 6= −∞ is solvable} ,
with U and V (λ) defined in (24). Finally, by Theorem 5, it follows that Uy ≤ V (λ)y is solvable
with finite yn+1 if, and only if, χn+1(U
♯V (λ)) ≥ 0. 
Remark 3. Butkovicˇ and Aminu [BA08] considered the following special cases of (21):
minimize px (resp. maximize qx)
subject to: Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d , x ∈ Rn
(28)
where p, q ∈ Rn, c, d ∈ Rm, r, s ∈ R and A,B ∈ Rm×n have only finite entries. Clearly, (21)
becomes (28) if we set r = −∞, q ≡ −∞ and s = 0 for minimization, or respectively s = −∞,
p ≡ −∞ and r = 0 for maximization, where the opposite (tropical inverse) of the minimal value of
λ equals the maximum of qx.
In this connection, formulation (27) (or equivalently (21)) has a good geometric insight, mean-
ing optimization for general tropical half-spaces (or hyperplanes) defined by bivectors (u, λ + v),
see [GK09, AGK11b] for more background.
Example 1. Assume we want to maximize (1+x1)∨ (3+x2) over the tropical polyhedron of R
2
max
defined by the system Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, where
A =


−∞ −1
−2 −2
−1 −∞
0 −∞

 , c =


−∞
−∞
−∞
−∞

 , B =


0 −∞
−∞ −∞
−∞ 0
−∞ 2

 , d =


0
0
0
0

 .
This tropical polyhedron is displayed on the left-hand side of Figure 6 below. This maximization
problem is equivalent to minimizing λ subject to 0 ≤ λ+((1+x1)∨(3+x2)), Ax∨c ≤ Bx∨d. Indeed,
the value of the latter problem is the opposite (tropical inverse) of the value of the maximization
problem. The homogeneous version of this minimization problem reads:
minimize λ
subject to: uy ≤ λ+ vy , Cy ≤ Dy , y3 6= −∞ , y ∈ R
3
max , λ ∈ Rmax
(29)
where C = [A, c], D = [B, d], u = (−∞,−∞, 0), and v = (1, 3,−∞).
3.2. Partial spectral functions and piecewise linearity. We have shown that solving the
tropical linear-fractional programming problem (21) is equivalent to finding the least zero of the
spectral function φ(λ) := χn+1(U
♯V (λ)). Here we will analyze the graph of this spectral function,
after introducing analogues of derivatives, the partial spectral functions.
Given a strategy σ ∈ S for player Max and a strategy τ ∈ T for player Min, we respectively define
the min-plus linear function U ♯V σ(λ) and the max-plus linear function U ♯τV (λ), see (9) and (16).
We introduce the partial spectral functions φσ(λ) := χn+1(U
♯V σ(λ)) and φτ (λ) := χn+1(U
♯
τV (λ)).
With this notation, (17) yields
(30) φ(λ) = max
σ∈S
φσ(λ) = min
τ∈T
φτ (λ) .
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φτ (λ)
φ(λ)
Figure 2. A partial spectral function (left) and a spectral function (right).
Partial spectral functions can be represented as in (6), where one of the strategies is fixed, see
also (20):
(31) φσ(λ) = min
τ∈T
ΦU,V (λ)(n+ 1, τ, σ) , φτ (λ) = max
σ∈S
ΦU,V (λ)(n+ 1, τ, σ) .
A graphical presentation of (31) and (30) using only φτ is given in Figure 2.
Let Gλ be the bipartite digraph of the mean payoff game whose payments are given by the
matrices U and V (λ), see Figures 3 and 4 below for illustrations. Observe that in this digraph,
only the weight of the arcs connecting node m + 1 of Max with nodes l ∈ [n + 1] of Min depend
on λ. Recall that given a strategy σ for player Max (resp. τ for player Min), Gσλ (resp. G
τ
λ) denotes
the bipartite subdigraph of Gλ obtained by deleting from Gλ all the arcs (i, j) such that i ∈ [m+1]
and j 6= σ(i) (resp. the arcs (j, i) such that j ∈ [n+ 1] and i 6= τ(j)).
We next investigate the properties of spectral functions.
Theorem 8. Let σ : [m+1] 7→ [n+1] be a positional strategy for player Max and τ : [n+1] 7→ [m+1]
be a positional strategy for player Min. Then,
(i) φ(λ), φτ (λ) and φ
σ(λ) are 1-Lipschitz nondecreasing piecewise-linear functions, whose linear
pieces are of the form (α+ βλ)/k, where k ∈ [min(m,n) + 1] and β ∈ {0, 1}.
(ii) If the absolute values of all the finite coefficients in (27) are bounded by M , then |α/k| ≤ 2M .
(iii) φτ (λ) is convex and φ
σ(λ) is concave. Both functions consist of no more than min(m,n) + 2
linear pieces.
Proof. As follows from (30) and (31), spectral functions are built from the finite number of functions
λ 7→ ΦU,V (λ)(n+1, σ, τ), each of which is given by the mean weight per turn of the only elementary
cycle in Gσ,τλ accessible from node n+ 1 of Min. Recall that G
σ,τ
λ is the subdigraph of Gλ where all
arcs at all nodes except for those chosen by player Max (strategy σ) and player Min (strategy τ) are
removed. As a function of λ, this mean weight per turn is a line (α+βλ)/k. Here k ∈ [min(m,n)+1]
since the length (i.e., the number of nodes of Max it contains) of any elementary cycle in the bipartite
digraph Gλ does not exceed both m + 1 and n + 1. Also β ∈ {0, 1}, because an elementary cycle
can contain node m + 1 of Max no more than once. If the absolute values of all the payments in
the game are bounded by M , then |α/k| ≤ 2M since the arithmetic mean of payments, counted
per turn, does not exceed the greatest sum of two consecutive payments.
Thus, the functions λ 7→ ΦU,V (λ)(n + 1, σ, τ) satisfy all the properties of (i) and (ii). Using (30)
and (31) we conclude that φ(λ), φτ (λ) and φ
σ(λ) also satisfy these properties.
Convexity (resp. concavity) of φτ (resp. φ
σ) follows from (31). In a convex or concave piecewise-
linear function, each slope can appear only once, while the possible slopes are 0, 1, 1/2,. . .,
1/(min(m,n) + 1). This shows (iii). 
Some useful facts can be deduced further from this description of spectral functions.
Corollary 9. Spectral functions satisfy the following properties:
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(i) If the absolute values of all coefficients in (27) are either infinite or bounded by M , then
φ(λ), φσ(λ) and φτ (λ) are linear for λ ≤ −4M(min(m,n) + 1)
2 and for λ ≥ 4M(min(m,n) +
1)2.
(ii) If the absolute values of all coefficients in (27) are either infinite or bounded by M , then the
solutions to the problems min{λ | φ(λ) ≥ 0}, min{λ | φσ(λ) ≥ 0} and min{λ | φτ (λ) ≥ 0} lie
(if finite) in [−2M(min(m,n)+1), 2M(min(m,n)+1)]. Moreover, if all the finite coefficients
are integers, then the solutions to all these problems are integers as well.
(iii) If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers, then the breaking points of φ(λ), φσ(λ) or φτ (λ)
are rational numbers whose denominators do not exceed min(m,n) + 1.
(iv) If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M , then φ(λ)
consists of no more than 8M(min(m,n) + 1)4 + 2 linear pieces.
Proof. (i) Consider the intersection point µ of one linear piece (α1 + β1λ)/k1 with another linear
piece (α2 + β2λ)/k2. By Theorem 8, k1, k2 ≤ min(m,n) + 1 and |α1/k1|, |α2/k2| ≤ 2M , and we
obtain from
|β1/k1 − β2/k2| ≥
1
(min(m,n) + 1)2
, |α1/k1 − α2/k2| ≤ 4M ,
that |µ| ≤ 4M(min(m,n) + 1)2. This means that φ(λ) is linear for λ ≥ 4M(min(m,n) + 1)2 and
λ ≤ −4M(min(m,n) + 1)2. (Note that this part did not impose the integrality of coefficients.)
(ii) Note that due to piecewise-linearity, the solution to each of these problems (if finite) is given
by the intersection point of a certain linear piece of the form (α + λ)/k with zero. Then, since
|α/k| ≤ 2M and k ≤ min(m,n) + 1 by Theorem 8, we conclude that this intersection point −α
lies in [−2M(min(m,n) + 1), 2M(min(m,n) + 1)]. Moreover, if the finite coefficients in (27) are
integers, then this solution −α is also integer.
(iii) By Theorem 8, spectral functions are piecewise linear and the linear pieces are of the form
(α + βλ)/k, where in particular k ∈ [min(m,n) + 1] and β ∈ {0, 1}. Considering the intersection
point µ of one such piece (α1+β1λ)/k1 with another piece (α2+β2λ)/k2 and assuming the integrity
of α1, α2 we obtain that µ = (k1α2 − k2α1)/(k2β1 − k1β2) is a rational number with denominator
not exceeding min(m,n) + 1.
(iv) The denominators of breaking points do not exceed min(m,n) + 1, and hence the difference
between their inverses is not less than 1/(min(m,n) + 1)2. This is a lower bound for the difference
between two consecutive breaking points. We get the claim applying part (i) . 
Note that to determine the slope of φ(λ) at +∞, meaning for λ ≥ 4M(min(m,n) + 1)2, or at
−∞, meaning for λ ≤ −4M(min(m,n)+1)2, we can set all the finite coefficients in (27) to 0. Then,
we “play” the mean payoff game at λ = 1 or at λ = −1, respectively.
Denote by MPGI(m,n,M) the worst-case complexity of an oracle computing the value of mean
payoff games with integer payments whose absolute values are bounded byM , withm nodes of Max
and n nodes of Min. There exist pseudo-polynomial algorithms computing the value of mean payoff
games. For instance, in [ZP96] the authors describe a value iteration algorithm with O(mn4M)
complexity. Using this we now show that all the linear pieces of a spectral function can be identified
in pseudo-polynomial time. Note that we do not require the oracle to compute optimal strategies
here.
Proposition 10. Let all the finite coefficients in (27) be integer with absolute values not exceeding
M . Then, all the linear pieces that constitute the graph of φ(λ) can be identified in
O(M min(m,n)4)×MPGI(m+ 1, n+ 1,M(min(m,n) + 1)(1 + 4(min(m,n) + 1)2))
operations.
Proof. By Corollary 9 part (iii), the breaking points of φ(λ) are rational numbers whose denom-
inators do not exceed min(m,n) + 1. To identify the linear pieces that constitute the graph
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of the spectral function, we only need to evaluate φ(λ) on such rational points in the interval
[−4M(min(m,n)+1)2, 4M(min(m,n)+1)2], the number of which does not exceed O(M min(m,n)4).
Further, when computing φ(λ), the payments in the mean payoff games that the oracle works
with are either a or a+ λ, where a is an integer satisfying |a| ≤ M and λ is a rational number in
[−4M(min(m,n) + 1)2, 4M(min(m,n) + 1)2] whose denominator does not exceed min(m,n) + 1.
The properties of the game will not change if we multiply all the payments by this denomina-
tor, obtaining a new game in which the payments are integers with absolute values bounded
by (min(m,n) + 1)(M + 4M(min(m,n) + 1)2). Then, the complexity of the mean payoff ora-
cle will not exceed MPGI(m + 1, n + 1, (min(m,n) + 1)(M + 4M(min(m,n) + 1)2)). Multiplying
by O(M min(m,n)4) we get the claim. 
Remark 4. It follows that the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) can be solved
in pseudo-polynomial time by reconstructing all the linear pieces that constitute the graph of φ(λ).
However, more efficient methods will be described in Subsection 3.4.
Remark 5. A similar spectral function has been introduced in [GS10] to compute the set of solutions
λ of the two-sided eigenproblem Ax = λBx. The present approach can be extended to a larger class
of parametric games, in which the payments are piecewise affine functions of the parameter λ, with
integer slopes. See [Ser10].
3.3. Strategies as certificates. In the classical simplex method, the optimality of a feasible
solution is certified by the sign of Lagrange multipliers. In the tropical case, following the idea
of [AGK11b], we shall show that the certificate is of a different nature: it is a strategy. We shall
also use such strategies to guide the next iteration of Newton method in Subsection 3.4, when the
current feasible solution is not optimal.
Definition 11 (Left and right optimal strategies). A strategy σ− for player Max (resp. τ− for
player Min) is left optimal at λ ∈ R, if there exists ǫ > 0 such that
φ(µ) = φσ−(µ) (resp. φ(µ) = φτ−(µ)) ∀µ ∈ [λ− ǫ, λ] .
Right optimal strategies σ+ and τ+ are defined in a similar way, replacing [λ− ǫ, λ] by [λ, λ+ ǫ].
The existence of left and right optimal strategies at each point follows readily from (30), together
with the finiteness of the number of strategies and the piecewise affine character of each function
φσ(λ) and φτ (λ).
Theorem 12. The tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) has the optimal value λ∗ ∈
R if, and only if, φ(λ∗) ≥ 0 and there exists a strategy τ for player Min such that the digraph Gτλ∗
satisfies the following conditions:
(i) all cycles accessible from node n+ 1 of Min have nonpositive weight,
(ii) any cycle of zero weight accessible from node n+1 of Min passes through node m+1 of Max.
Moreover, these conditions are always satisfied when τ is left optimal at λ∗.
Proof. The tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) has the optimal value λ∗ if, and
only if, φ(λ∗) = 0 and φ(λ) < 0 for all λ < λ∗. If τ is any left optimal strategy at λ∗, then the
previous conditions are satisfied if, and only if, φτ (λ
∗) = 0 and φτ (λ) has nonzero left derivative at
λ∗.
By (31), or (19) and (20), we know that φτ (λ) is the maximal cycle mean (per turn) over all
cycles in Gτλ accessible from node n+ 1 of Min. It follows that φτ (λ
∗) = 0 if, and only if, all cycles
in Gτλ∗ accessible from node n+1 of Min have nonpositive weight and at least one of them has zero
weight. Moreover, φτ (λ) has nonzero left derivative at λ
∗ if, and only if, any zero-weight cycle in
Gτλ∗ accessible from node n+1 of Min has arcs with weights depending on λ, which can only occur
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if it passes through node m + 1 of Max. Thus, the conditions of the theorem are necessary and
they are satisfied by any left optimal strategy τ at λ∗.
Assume now that there exists a strategy τ satisfying the conditions of the theorem. Then, the
argument above shows that φτ (λ
∗) ≤ 0 and φτ (λ) < 0 for all λ < λ
∗. Since φ(λ∗) ≥ 0 and by (30)
we have φ(λ) ≤ φτ (λ) for all λ, it follows that φ(λ
∗) = 0 and φ(λ) < 0 for all λ < λ∗. Therefore,
λ∗ is the optimal value of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27). 
In the same way, we can certify when the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) is
unbounded.
Theorem 13. The tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) is unbounded if, and only
if, there exists a strategy σ for player Max such that all cycles in the digraph Gσ0 accessible from
node n+ 1 of Min do not contain node m+ 1 of Max and have nonnegative weight.
Proof. We know that the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) is unbounded if, and
only if, φ(λ) ≥ 0 for all λ. By the first equality in (30), the latter condition is satisfied if, and only
if, there exists a strategy σ for player Max such that φσ(λ) ≥ 0 for all λ. Note that the weight of
a cycle in Gσλ that passes through node m+ 1 of Max can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing
λ, because this cycle must contain an arc whose weight depends on λ. Therefore, using the fact
that φσ(λ) is the minimal cycle mean (per turn) over all cycles in Gσλ accessible from node n+1 of
Min (see (31), or (19) and (20)), it follows that φσ(λ) ≥ 0 for all λ if, and only if, all cycles in Gσ0
accessible from node n+1 of Min have nonnegative weight and do not pass through node m+1 of
Max. 
Remark 6. Theorems 12 and 13 are inspired by Theorem 18 and Corollary 20 of [AGK11b], in
which similar certificates are given for the problem of checking whether an implication of the form
Ax ≤ Bx =⇒ px ≤ qx holds. The latter can be cast as a special tropical linear-fractional
programming problem.
Example 2. Consider the tropical linear programming problem given by the minimization of (2 +
x1) ∨ (−4 + x2) over the tropical polyhedron of R
2
max defined by the system of inequalities Ax∨ c ≤
Bx ∨ d, where
A =


−∞ −∞
−∞ −∞
−∞ −∞
−∞ −3
−∞ −4
−∞ −5
−∞ −6


, c =


0
0
0
0
−∞
−∞
−∞


, B =


−2 0
0 −1
1 −2
2 −∞
0 −∞
−2 −∞
−4 −∞


, d =


−∞
−∞
−∞
−∞
0
0
0


.
This polyhedron is displayed on the left-hand side of Figure 5 below. The direction of minimization
of (2+x1)∨(−4+x2) is shown there by a dotted line above the polyhedron, together with the optimal
tropical hyperplane (2+x1)∨ (−4+x2) = 0. The bipartite digraph Gλ corresponding to this problem
is depicted in Figure 3, where the nodes of Max are represented by squares and the nodes of Min
by circles. Note that in this case we have m = 7 and n = 2.
The equivalent homogeneous version of this problem (as described in Subsection 3.1) is to min-
imize λ subject to uy ≤ λ + vy, Cy ≤ Dy, and y3 6= −∞, where C = [A, c], D = [B, d],
u = (2,−4,−∞) and v = (−∞,−∞, 0).
Thanks to Theorem 12, it is possible to certify that λ∗ = 0 is the optimal value of this problem.
To show this, consider the strategy τ for player Min defined by: τ(1) = 8, τ(2) = 4 and τ(3) = 4,
which is represented in bold in Figure 3. Observe that the resulting subdigraph Gτλ∗ contains only
one cycle, which is accessible from node n+1 of Min (indeed it passes through this node), has zero
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Figure 3. The bipartite digraph Gλ of the mean payoff game associated with the
tropical linear programming problem of Example 2. Special nodes n+ 1 and m+ 1
are in bold as well as a strategy τ for player Min certifying the optimality of λ∗ = 0.
The subdigraph Gτλ∗ is obtained by deleting the dashed arcs.
weight and passes through node m+1 of Max. Moreover, by Theorem 5, we have φ(λ∗) ≥ 0 because
y = (−2, 2, 0)T satisfies Cy ≤ Dy and uy ≤ λ∗+ vy = vy. Therefore, by Theorem 12, λ∗ = 0 is the
optimal value.
The special cases (28) of the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27) have been
studied in [BA08], where necessary and sufficient conditions for these problems to be unbounded
were in particular given. We next show that under the assumptions of [BA08], which require the
entries of all vectors and matrices to be finite, these conditions turn out to be equivalent to the one
given in Theorem 13.
Theorem 3.3 of [BA08] shows that, when only finite entries are considered, the minimization
problem in (28) is unbounded if, and only if, c ≤ d. Under the finiteness assumption, this condition
is equivalent to the one given in Theorem 13. To show this, in the first place observe that in this
case the associated digraph Gλ (see Figure 4) contains arcs connecting any node of Min [n + 1]
with any the node of Max [m + 1], with exception of the arc connecting node n + 1 with node
m+ 1, and arcs connecting any node of Max [m+ 1] with any node of Min [n+ 1], with exception
of the arcs connecting node m + 1 with nodes in [n]. Thus, if we define the strategy σ for player
Max by σ(i) = n + 1 for all i ∈ [m + 1], it can be checked that the only cycles in Gσ0 accessible
from node n + 1 are of the form n + 1 → i1 → n + 1 → · · · → n + 1 → ik → n + 1 for some
i1, . . . , ik ∈ [m]. Since the weight of such a cycle is di1 − ci1 + · · ·+ dik − cik , the strategy σ satisfies
the conditions in Theorem 13 if c ≤ d. Conversely, assume that a strategy σ for player Max satisfies
the conditions in Theorem 13. Then, the only possible value for σ(m + 1) is n + 1, and we must
also have σ(i) = n + 1 for all i ∈ [m], because if σ(i) = j 6= n + 1 for some i ∈ [m], Gσ0 would
contain the cycle m+ 1→ n+ 1→ i→ j → m+ 1, contradicting the fact that no cycle accessible
from node n + 1 of Min passes through node m + 1 of Max. Now, since Gσ0 contains the cycles
n + 1 → i → n + 1 for i ∈ [m], which are accessible from node n + 1 of Min, the weights of these
cycles di − ci must be nonnegative, implying that c ≤ d.
Regarding the maximization problem in (28), Theorem 3.4 of [BA08] shows that this problem
is unbounded if, and only if, the system Ax ≤ Bx has a finite solution. In this case, due to
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Figure 4. On the left: the bipartite digraph of the mean payoff game associated
with the tropical linear programming problem (26). The nodes of Max are repre-
sented by squares and the nodes of Min by circles. In the middle and on the right:
the bipartite digraphs of the special cases (28), for the minimization problem and
the maximization problem, respectively.
the finiteness assumption, it follows that the associated digraph Gλ (see Figure 4) contains arcs
connecting any node of Max [m + 1] with any node of Min [n + 1], with exception of the arc
connecting node m + 1 with node n + 1, and arcs connecting any node of Min [n + 1] with any
the node of Max [m + 1], with exception of the arcs connecting nodes in [n] with node m + 1. If
the system Ax ≤ Bx has a finite solution, from Theorem 5 and (17) it follows that there exists
a strategy σ¯ : [m] 7→ [n] such that χ(A♯Bσ¯) = χ(A♯B) ≥ 0. By (19) and (20), this implies that
any cycle in G¯σ¯ has nonnegative weight, where G¯ is the bipartite digraph of the mean payoff game
associated with the matrices A and B. If we define the strategy σ(i) = σ¯(i) for all i ∈ [m] and
σ(m + 1) = j for some j ∈ [n], then σ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 13 because the cycles
accessible from node n+1 of Min in Gσ0 are precisely the cycles in G¯
σ¯ and there is no cycle containing
node m + 1 of Max in Gσ0 . Conversely, if a strategy σ for player Max satisfies the conditions in
Theorem 13, then necessarily we have σ(i) ∈ [n] for all i ∈ [m], because if σ(i) = n + 1 for some
i ∈ [m], Gσ0 would contain the cycle n + 1 → m + 1 → j → i → n + 1 where j = σ(m + 1) ∈ [n],
contradicting the fact that there is no cycle in Gσ0 accessible from node n+1 of Min passing through
node m + 1 of Max. Now, if we define σ¯(i) = σ(i) for all i ∈ [m], the cycles accessible from node
n+ 1 of Min in Gσ0 are precisely the cycles in G¯
σ¯, which therefore have nonnegative weight. Then,
by (19) and (20) we have χ(A♯Bσ¯) ≥ 0, and so from Theorem 5 and (17) we conclude that the
system Ax ≤ Bx has a finite solution.
Remark 7. If the strategies σ or τ and the scalar λ∗ are fixed (considered as inputs) the conditions
of Theorems 12 and 13, i.e. the validity of the certificates, can be checked in polynomial time.
To see this, in the first place assume that τ and λ∗ are given. Using Karp’s algorithm, compute
the maximal cycle mean of each strongly connected component of Gτλ∗ that is accessible from node
n + 1 of Min. The certificate is valid only if these maximal cycle means are nonpositive and one
of them is zero. To check the second condition of Theorem 12, delete node m+ 1 of Max (and the
arcs adjacent to it) from Gτλ∗ and compute for the resulting digraph (using again Karp’s algorithm)
the maximal cycle mean of each strongly connected component accessible from node n + 1 of Min.
To be valid, all these maximal cycle means must be negative. Observe that in Theorem 12 we also
assume that φ(λ∗) ≥ 0. By (30), this can be certified by a strategy σ for player Max such that the
minimal cycle mean of any strongly connected component of Gσλ∗ accessible from node n+1 of Min
is nonnegative, which can be checked by applying Karp’s algorithm to each of these components.
By Theorem 5, another possibility is to exhibit a vector y such that Cy ≤ Dy, uy ≤ λ∗ + vy and
yn+1 6= −∞.
Assume now that σ is given. To check the validity of the certificate in Theorem 13, decompose
first Gσ0 in strongly connected components and see whether the component containing node m+1 of
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Max is trivial (i.e. contains just this node) or it is not accessible from node n + 1 of Min. If this
is the case, compute the minimal cycle mean of each strongly connected component of Gσ0 accessible
from node n+1 of Min by applying Karp’s algorithm. Then, the certificate is valid if each of these
minimal cycle means is nonnegative.
3.4. Bisection and Newton methods for tropical linear-fractional programming. In (25),
we need to find the least λ such that φ(λ) ≥ 0, where φ(λ) is nondecreasing and Lipschitz continuous.
Thus, we can consider certain classical methods for finding zeroes of “good enough” functions of
one variable. In particular, the bisection method for φ(λ) corresponds to the approach of [BA08].
More specifically, it can be formulated as follows, when the finite coefficients in (27) are integers.
Algorithm 1. Bisection method
Start. A point λ0 such that φ(λ0) ≥ 0 and a point λ0 such that φ(λ0) < 0.
Iteration k. Let λ = ⌈(λk−1+λk−1)/2⌉. If φ(λ) ≥ 0, then set λk = λ and λk = λk−1. Otherwise,
set λk = λk−1 and λk = λ.
Stop. Verify λk − λk = 1. If true, return λk.
For this method, which uses that tropical linear-fractional programming preserves integrity
(Corollary 9 part (iv)), it is not important to know the actual value of φ(λ), but just whether
φ(λ) ≥ 0, i.e. whether Uy ≤ V (λ)y is solvable with yn+1 6= −∞.
Further, the concept of (left, right) optimal strategy, see Definition 11, yields an analogue of
(left, right) derivative, and leads to the following analogue of Newton method, which does not have
any integer restriction.
Algorithm 2. Positive Newton method
Start. A point λ0 such that φ(λ0) ≥ 0.
Iteration k. Find a left optimal strategy σ for player Max at λk−1 and compute λk = min{λ ∈
Rmax | φ
σ(λ) ≥ 0}.
Stop. Verify λk = λk−1 or λk = −∞. If true, return λk.
It remains to explain how each step of this algorithm can be implemented. We shall see that
λk can be easily computed (reduction to a shortest path problem) and that finding left optimal
strategies can be done by existing algorithms for mean payoff games.
For the sake of comparison, we state a dual version of Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 3. Negative Newton method
Start. A point λ0 such that φ(λ0) < 0.
Iteration k. Find a (right) optimal strategy τ for player Min at λk−1 and compute λk = min{λ ∈
Rmax | φτ (λ) ≥ 0}.
Stop. Verify φ(λk) = 0 or λk = +∞. If true, return λk.
Remark 8. Note that in Algorithm 3 we can use optimal strategies instead of right optimal ones,
because if τ is optimal at λk−1, we have φτ (λk−1) = φ(λk−1) < 0 and so λk > λk−1 by the definition
of λk (recall that by Theorem 8 all the spectral functions are nondecreasing and piecewise-linear).
This means that all the strategies considered in the iterations of Algorithm 3 are different, and as
the number of strategies is finite, this algorithm must terminate in a finite number of steps. A
similar argument shows that we can also use optimal strategies in Algorithm 2 at points λk−1 where
the spectral function φ is strictly positive, because in that case we have λk < λk−1 even if σ is
just optimal and not left optimal (however, when φ(λk−1) = 0 and λk−1 is not optimal, only a left
optimal strategy at λk−1 guarantees λk < λk−1).
Remark 9. Due to Corollary 9 part (ii), the values λ+ := 2M(min(m,n) + 1) and λ− :=
−2M(min(m,n) + 1) can be first checked in the case of the positive and negative Newton meth-
ods, respectively. We recall that M is a bound on the absolute value of the coefficients in (27).
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If φ(λ+) < 0 then the problem is infeasible, and if φ(λ−) > 0 then the problem is unbounded.
If φ(λ+) ≥ 0 and φ(λ−) < 0, then the problem is both feasible and bounded. The case φ(λ−) = 0
requires a left optimal strategy for player Max at λ− to decide that either this point is optimal, or
the problem is unbounded.
This rule of starting with ±2M(min(m,n) + 1), as we shall see, secures pseudo-polynomiality of
the instances of the mean payoff games generated by the bisection and Newton methods.
The following logarithmic bound on the complexity of the bisection method is standard and its
proof will be omitted.
Proposition 14. If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M ,
then the number of iterations of the bisection method does not exceed log(4M(min(m,n) + 1)) if it
is started as in Remark 9. Hence, the computational complexity of the bisection method in this case
does not exceed
log(4M(min(m,n) + 1)) ×MPGI(m+ 1, n + 1,M + 2M(min(m,n) + 1)) .
Remark 10. Butkovicˇ and Aminu [BA08] give better initial values λ0 and λ0 for the bisection
method than ±2M(min(m,n) + 1), but only for the special cases (28), where all the coefficients
are assumed to be finite. These initial values depend on the input data and lie in the interval
[−3M, 3M ]. As oracle, they exploit the alternating method of [CGB03], which requires O(mn(m+
n)M) operations, being related to the value iteration of [ZP96]. Hence, in this case, the complexity
of the bisection method is no more than O(mn(m + n)M logM). In [Ser10], the same kind of
initial values were obtained for the general formulation (21), leading to a similar complexity, but
with the same finiteness restriction on the coefficients. The initial values of [BA08] and [Ser10] will
be exploited in the numerical experiments, see Subsection 4.3.
As observed above, in the case of the bisection method the mean payoff oracle is only required
to check whether φ(λ) ≥ 0.
In the case when the finite coefficients in (27) are real, the bisection method computes (λk−1 +
λk−1)/2 without rounding and it yields only an approximate solution to the problem. However,
Newton methods always converge in a finite number of steps.
Proposition 15. Denote by |S| and |T | the number of available strategies for players Max and
Min, respectively. Then,
(i) Algorithms 2 and 3 terminate in a finite number of steps, the number of which does not exceed
|S| and |T |, respectively.
(ii) If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M , then the
values λk produced by Algorithm 2 are also integer, and the number of iterations does not
exceed 4M(min(m,n) + 1) if it is started as in Remark 9.
Proof. (i) At different iterations of Algorithm 2 we have different strategies, because λk = min{λ ∈
Rmax | φ
σ(λ) ≥ 0} are different for all k. Similarly for Algorithm 3, with τ instead of σ. Thus, the
number of steps is limited by the number of strategies, which is finite.
(ii) The numbers λk generated by Algorithm 2 are integers due to Corollary 9 part (ii). By
Remark 9, we can start the algorithm at 2M(min(m,n) + 1), and it will finish before it reaches
−2M(min(m,n) + 1). 
A worst-case complexity bound, different from the number of strategies, will be given below in
Theorem 19, and it is worse than that of the bisection method above (see also Remark 10). First,
Newton iterations require more sophisticated oracles which compute the value of the game and a
left optimal strategy. Second, we have only used the integrality of the method in Proposition 15,
so the bound on the number of iterations is rough. However, the positive Newton method is an
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interesting alternative to the bisection method, since it preserves feasibility. Therefore, it may be
more sensitive to the geometry of the feasible set, which is especially convenient if this set has only
few generators or its dimension is small. The experiments of Subsection 4.3 indicate that this is
indeed the case, and the worst-case complexity bound of Theorem 19 (using Proposition 15) is often
too pessimistic. The main reason to give the result of Theorem 19 is that it shows the method is
pseudo-polynomial.
Not aiming to obtain a better overall worst-case complexity result, in the next subsection we
will rather consider the implementation of the positive Newton method, reducing the computation
of λk to a (polynomial-time solvable) shortest path problem. Subsection 3.6 will be devoted to the
computation of left optimal strategies in the integer case by means of perturbed mean payoff games.
As noticed in Proposition 15, Newton iterations should work also in the case of real coefficients.
For this we propose the algebraic approach of Subsection 3.7, encoding a perturbed game as a game
over the semiring of germs.
3.5. Newton iterations by means of Kleene star. In this subsection we show that in the case
of Algorithm 2 the steps of Newton method can be performed by calculating least solutions of
inequalities of the form z ≥ Ez ∨ h, as in Proposition 6.
Assume that we are at iteration k of Algorithm 2, so that we need to compute λk = min{λ ∈
Rmax | φ
σ(λ) ≥ 0}, where σ is a left optimal strategy for player Max at λk−1. If we set V
σ(λ)
instead of V (λ) in Uy ≤ V (λ)y, by Theorem 5 the minimal zero λk of φ
σ(λ) is exactly the least
value of λ for which this system is satisfied by some y ∈ Rn+1max with yn+1 6= −∞, i.e. we have
(32) λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V
σ(λ)y , yn+1 6= −∞ is solvable} .
The main idea is to compute this minimal zero by considering the system Uy ≤ V σ(λ)y directly.
With this aim, we shall need the following observation.
Lemma 16. Assume that at iteration k of Algorithm 2 we have l := σ(m+1) 6= n+ 1, where σ is
a left optimal strategy for player Max at λk−1. Then, if
(33) (Uy ≤ V σ(λ)y and yn+1 6= −∞) =⇒ yl 6= −∞ ,
for all λ, it follows that
(34) λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V
σ(λ)y , yl 6= −∞ is solvable} .
Otherwise, i.e. if Condition (33) does not hold, λk = −∞.
Proof. Condition (33) implies that the minimum in (34) is less than or equal to that in (32).
To show the converse, suppose that for some λ ∈ R there exists yˆ ∈ Rn+1max such that yˆl 6= −∞
and Uyˆ ≤ V σ(λ)yˆ. Since φσ(λk−1) = φ(λk−1) ≥ 0, by Theorem 5 there exists a solution y˜ of
Uy ≤ V σ(λk−1)y (and so, in particular, of the first m inequalities of this system, i.e. Cy ≤ D
σy)
such that y˜n+1 6= −∞. Then, for any β ∈ R the combination y = yˆ ∨ y˜ − β satisfies the first m
inequalities in Uy ≤ V σ(λ)y (in other words, we have Cy ≤ Dσy) as a tropical linear combination
of solutions of this system of tropically linear inequalities. Moreover, if β is sufficiently large, y also
satisfies the last inequality uy ≤ λ + vσy of the system Uy ≤ V σ(λ)y because uyˆ ≤ λ + vσ yˆ and
vσ yˆ = vl + yˆl > −∞. But then y satisfies Uy ≤ V
σ(λ)y and yn+1 ≥ y˜n+1 − β 6= −∞. This shows
that the minimum in (32) is less than or equal to that in (34).
Finally, if Condition (33) does not hold, for some λ¯ there exists a solution y¯ of the system
Uy ≤ V σ(λ¯)y such that y¯n+1 6= −∞ but y¯l = −∞. Since uy¯ ≤ λ¯ + v
σ y¯ = λ¯ + vl + y¯l, this can
only happen if uy¯ = −∞, which implies that y¯ satisfies Uy¯ ≤ V σ(λ)y¯ for any λ ∈ R, and so
λk = −∞. 
We next show how to make sure that Condition (33) is satisfied. Note that this condition is not
satisfied if, and only if, for some λ the system Uy ≤ V σ(λ)y has a solution y¯ with y¯n+1 6= −∞
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but y¯l = −∞. The latter implies the existence of a solution y¯ of Cy ≤ Dy such that y¯i = −∞ for
all i ∈ supp(u), but y¯n+1 6= −∞ (so in particular Condition (33) is satisfied if n + 1 ∈ supp(u)).
Eliminating from the system Cy ≤ Dy the columns corresponding to the indices in supp(u), the
existence of such a solution is reduced to the solvability of a two-sided homogeneous system with
the condition yn+1 6= −∞, which can be decided using a mean payoff game oracle. If this problem
has no solution, then Condition (33) is satisfied. Otherwise, the value of the original tropical
linear-fractional programming problem is −∞.
As a consequence of the previous discussion, in what follows we assume that it has already been
checked that Condition (33) is satisfied, and we explain how to perform Newton iterations in that
case.
Suppose that we are at iteration k of Algorithm 2, and let σ be a left optimal strategy at λk−1.
Then, if we set l := σ(m+ 1), by Lemma 16 we have
λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V
σ(λ)y , yl 6= −∞ is solvable} .
Since the system Uy ≤ V σ(λ)y is satisfied by some y¯ with y¯l 6= −∞ if, and only if, it is satisfied by
some yˆ with yˆl = 0 (it is enough to define yˆi = y¯i − y¯l for all i ∈ [n+ 1]), it follows that
λk = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Uy ≤ V
σ(λ)y , yl = 0 is solvable}
= min{λ ∈ Rmax | Cy ≤ D
σy , uy ≤ λ+ vl + yl , yl = 0 is solvable} .
Thus, setting yl = 0 we are in the situation of problem (28), because λk + vl is given by:
minimize px ∨ r
subject to: Ax ∨ c ≤ Bσx ∨ dσ , x ∈ Rnmax
(35)
where p ∈ Rnmax, r ∈ Rmax, c, d
σ ∈ Rmmax and A,B
σ ∈ Rm×nmax are such that
U =
(
A c
p r
)
and V σ(λ) =
(
Bσ dσ
−∞ λ+ vl
)
.
Here, just for the simplicity of the presentation, column l is in the place of column n + 1 when
l 6= n+1 (in other words, the columns of A and Bσ are respectively the columns of C and Dσ with
exception of column l, c is column l of C, dσ is column l of Dσ, r = ul and pi = ui for i 6= l).
We claim that the system of constraints (the second line) in (35) has a least solution, which then
minimizes px ∨ r, and we explain how to find it. First note that the constraints in (35) can be
written as:
(Ax)i ∨ ci ≤ biσ(i) + xσ(i) , if σ(i) 6= l ,
(Ax)i ∨ ci ≤ di , if σ(i) = l .
(36)
In order to find the least solution of this system, observe that the second subsystem can be
dispensed with. Indeed, since φσ(λk−1) = φ(λk−1) ≥ 0, by Theorem 5 there exists a solution y˜
of Uy ≤ V σ(λk−1)y such that y˜n+1 6= −∞, and so this solution also satisfies y˜l 6= −∞ (recall we
assume that Condition (33) holds). Then, if x˜ ∈ Rnmax is the vector defined by x˜i := y˜i − y˜l for
i 6= l, it follows that x˜ is a solution of (36). Hence, if the first subsystem has the least solution x,
we have x ≤ x˜ and so x is also a solution of the second subsystem.
To show that the first subsystem in (36) has a least solution, first note that a system of two
inequalities of the form
r11 + x1 ∨ · · · ∨ r1n + xn ≤ x1
r21 + x1 ∨ · · · ∨ r2n + xn ≤ x1
is equivalent to just one inequality:
s1 + x1 ∨ · · · ∨ sn + xn ≤ x1 ,
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where si = r1i ∨ r2i for i = 1, . . . , n. Using this kind of reduction, the first subsystem can be
transformed in no more than m(n+ 1) operations to an equivalent system of the form
(37) ExI ∨ FxJ ∨ h ≤ xI ,
where xI is the sub-vector whose coordinates appear on the right-hand side of the first subsystem
in (36), and xJ is the sub-vector corresponding to the rest of the coordinates which are present
in that system. Since we are interested in the least solution, we can set xJ ≡ −∞, and then the
remaining system is just of the form
(38) Ez ∨ h ≤ z ,
where z = xI . By Proposition 6, the least solution to this system in R
|I|
is given by
z = E∗h = h ∨ Eh ∨ E2h ∨ E3h ∨ · · ·
As x˜I satisfies (38), we have z ≤ x˜I and so z ∈ R
|I|
max.
Thus, we have the following method:
Algorithm 4. Solving (35)
Step 1. Split the system Ax ∨ c ≤ Bσx ∨ dσ in two subsystems as in (36) and transform the
first subsystem to the form (37).
Step 2. Compute z = E∗h. Set xI = z and xJ ≡ −∞.
Step 3. Return px ∨ r.
We also conclude the following.
Proposition 17. The problems min{λ | φσ(λ) ≥ 0} can be solved in O(mn) +O(n3) time.
Note that in general, a system of the form (36) is solvable in Rnmax if, and only if, the least
solution of the first subsystem belongs to Rnmax and satisfies the second subsystem.
Example 3. Consider the following tropical linear-fractional programming problem:
minimize λ
subject to: uy ≤ λ+ vy , Cy ≤ Dy , y4 6= −∞ , y ∈ R
4
max , λ ∈ Rmax
where
C =


−3 −4 −∞ −∞
−1 −∞ −∞ 1
−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
1 −∞ 0 −∞

 , D =


−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
−∞ 0 −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ 3

 ,
u = (−∞, 0,−∞,−∞) and v = (3,−∞,−∞,−∞), so in this case we have m = 4 and n = 3 with
the notation of Problem (27).
Before performing Newton iterations, we need to check whether the system Cy ≤ Dy has solutions
with y2 = −∞ but y4 6= −∞ (since supp(u) = {2}). By the second inequality of this system, it
follows that this is impossible. Hence, Condition (33) is satisfied and so we can use (34) in order
to compute λk. Moreover, in this example Newton method requires no more than two iterations,
since player Max has only two strategies, which correspond to the two finite entries in the last row
of D.
Assume that we start with λ0 = 0. Then, an optimal strategy σ for player Max at λ0 is given by:
σ(1) = 4, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 4 and σ(5) = 1. Since l = σ(m+ 1) = σ(5) = 1, we have
λ1 = min{λ ∈ Rmax | Cy ≤ D
σy , y2 = uy ≤ λ+ v1 + y1 , y1 = 0 is solvable} ,
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and so, setting y1 = 0, λ1 + v1 = λ1 + 3 is given by:
minimize y2
subject to: (y2 − 4) ∨ (−3) ≤ y4 , (y4 + 1) ∨ (−1) ≤ y2 , y4 ≤ 0 , y3 ∨ 1 ≤ y4 + 3 .
(39)
Note that the system of constraints in (39), obtained by setting y1 = 0 in Cy ≤ D
σy (i.e., in (36)
the first column plays the role of free term), reduces to
E
(
y2
y4
)
∨ Fy3 ∨ h ≤
(
y2
y4
)
, y4 ≤ 0 ,
where
E =
(
−∞ 1
−4 −∞
)
, F =
(
−∞
−3
)
, h =
(
−1
−2
)
.
Since
E∗h =
(
0 1
−4 0
)(
−1
−2
)
=
(
−1
−2
)
,
the least solution of the system of constraints in (39) is (y2, y3, y4)
T = (−1,−∞,−2). Therefore,
the value of problem (39) is −1, and thus λ1 = −4. It can be checked that this is the optimal solution
of the tropical programming problem (and in particular, that σ is still a left optimal strategy for
player Max at λ1 = −4).
3.6. Computing left optimal strategies. In order to compute left optimal strategies, consider
the mean payoff game associated with the tropical linear-fractional programming problem (27), and
let the weights λ+ v of the arcs connecting node m+ 1 of Max with nodes of Min be replaced by
λ − ǫ + v, where ǫ ∈ R. In this way, we obtain a perturbed mean payoff game. For small enough
ǫ > 0, the optimal strategies for this game are the left optimal strategies required by the positive
Newton iterations. Here, we will require the mean payoff oracle to find optimal strategies, not just
the value of the game. The complexity of such oracle will be denoted by MPGI*(m,n,M), for
mean payoff games with integer payments whose absolute values are bounded by M , with m nodes
of Max and n nodes of Min. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm for computing optimal strategies of
such games is described in [ZP96].
Proposition 18. If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M ,
then at each iteration of the positive Newton method, started and finished as in Remark 9, a left
optimal strategy can be found in
MPGI*(m+ 1, n+ 1, (min(m,n) + 2)(M + 2M(min(m,n) + 1)) + 1)
operations.
Proof. By Corollary 9, it follows that each λk is integer and the breaking points of φ(λ) are rational
numbers whose denominators do not exceed min(m,n) + 1. Therefore, optimal strategies for the
game at λ∗ = λk − 1/(min(m,n) + 2) are left optimal strategies at λk. Then, we only need to
apply a mean payoff oracle in order to compute optimal strategies for the perturbed mean payoff
game with ǫ = 1/(min(m,n) + 2). Multiplying (in the usual sense) the payments by min(m,n) + 2
we obtain a mean payoff game with integer payments and with the same optimal strategies (in
this sense, equivalent to the perturbed game). The computation of optimal strategies in the latter
game takes no more than MPGI*(m + 1, n + 1, (min(m,n) + 2)(M + 2M(min(m,n) + 1)) + 1)
operations, because the payments in the perturbed mean payoff game are either of the form a or
a + λk − ǫ, where |a| ≤ M and |λk| ≤ 2M(min(m,n) + 1), and these payments are multiplied by
min(m,n) + 2. 
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Example 4. In order to find a left optimal strategy σ for player Max at λk−1 = 0 in Example 3, we
only need to compute an optimal strategy for the associated game at λ∗ = λk−1−1/(min(m,n)+2) =
−1/5. This can be done by solving the game whose payments are given by the matrices

−15 −20 −∞ −∞
−5 −∞ −∞ 5
−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
5 −∞ 0 −∞
−∞ 0 −∞ −∞

 and


−∞ −∞ −∞ 0
−∞ 0 −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ −∞
0 −∞ −∞ 15
14 −∞ −∞ −∞

 ,
which are obtained by multiplying (in the usual sense) the payments for the game at λ∗ by 5.
Remark 11. Proposition 18 was necessary to establish the pseudo-polynomiality of the positive
Newton method, which regularly uses left optimal strategies. However, as observed in Remark 8,
the use of left optimal strategies is not necessary when φ(λk) > 0. Moreover, when φ(λk) = 0 and
the coefficients are integers, an alternative to computing a left optimal strategy is to use an optimal
strategy, checking whether φ(λk − 1) < 0 when λk+1 = λk. In that case, Corollary 9 part (ii)
guarantees that λk is optimal. Otherwise, proceed with λk+1 := λk − 1. With this modification, the
complexity of the computation of optimal strategies falls to
MPGI*(m+ 1, n + 1,M + 2M(min(m,n) + 1)) ,
instead of the bound of Proposition 18.
We are now ready to sum up the computational complexity of the positive Newton method with
left optimal strategies.
Theorem 19. If the finite coefficients in (27) are integers with absolute values bounded by M , then
the positive Newton method, started and finished as in Remark 9, takes no more than
O(M min(m,n))× (O(mn) +O(n3)+
+MPGI*(m+ 1, n + 1, (min(m,n) + 2)(M + 2M(min(m,n) + 1)) + 1))
operations. In particular, the positive Newton method is pseudo-polynomial.
Proof. As the numbers λk generated by the positive Newton method are integers and lie within
[−2M(min(m,n)+1), 2M(min(m,n)+1)], the number of iterations does not exceed 4M(min(m,n)+
1) + 1. Combining this with Propositions 17 and 18, we get the claim. 
Note that Remark 11 can be used to reduce the bound of Theorem 19, if the left optimal strategies
are not used, getting rid of the factor (min(m,n) + 2) in the third argument of MPGI*.
3.7. Perturbed mean payoff games as mean payoff games over germs. Next we discuss
an alternative to the perturbation technique of the previous subsection: instead of considering the
mean payoff game for several values of the perturbation parameter, we may consider a mean payoff
game the payments of which belong to a lattice ordered group of germs. In a nutshell, the elements
of this group encode infinitesimal perturbations of the payments. This algebraic structure allows
one to deal more generally with one-parameter perturbed games (not only the ones arising from
tropical linear-fractional programming). A similar structure appeared in [GG98]. This is somehow
analogous to the perturbation methods used to avoid degeneracy in linear programming. We hope
to develop this further in a subsequent work. The materials of this subsection are not used in the
rest of the paper. However, this alternative can be useful in two respects: 1) to develop the present
Newton method in the case of real coefficients, 2) to improve the complexity result of the previous
subsection.
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Consider a mean payoff game over germs, finite-duration version, where the weights of arcs in G
are pairs of real numbers (a, b) endowed with lexicographic order:
(40) (a1, b1) ≤lex (a
2, b2)⇔
{
a1 < a2, or
a1 = a2, b1 ≤ b2,
and the componentwise addition is used to calculate the weights of paths (or cycles). These
games correspond to two-sided tropical linear systems over the semiring of germs Gmax := R
2 ∪
{(−∞,−∞)}, where for g1 = (a1, b1), g2 = (a2, b2) ∈ Gmax we define “g
1 + g2” := max(g1, g2)
following (40) and “g1g2” := (a1 + a2, b1 + b2).
With a game over germs we associate an ǫ-perturbed mean payoff game, for ǫ ≥ 0, in which the
weights (a, b) of the arcs are replaced by a+ ǫb. If the payments in a mean payoff game over germs
are given by the matrices A and B (with entries in Gmax), then the matrices associated with the
corresponding ǫ-perturbed mean payoff game will be denoted by A(ǫ) and B(ǫ), respectively.
Proposition 20. Suppose that the matrices of payments in a mean payoff game over germs (finite-
duration version) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. Then this game has a value and positional optimal
strategies (meaning that (6) holds for mean payoff games over germs). Moreover, if (χi, κi) is the
value of such a game, then there exists ǫ > 0 such that for any 0 < ǫ < ǫ the associated ǫ-perturbed
mean payoff game has value χi + ǫκi and these games have common positional optimal strategies.
Proof. Note that if the matrices of payments A and B in a mean payoff game over germs satisfy
Assumptions 1 and 2, then for any ǫ-perturbed mean payoff game the corresponding matrices A(ǫ)
and B(ǫ) also satisfy these assumptions.
Let δ be the minimal absolute value of nonzero differences between cycle means in the mean
payoff game with payments given by A(0) and B(0), and let M be the greatest absolute value of
the second component of germs. Define ǫ := δ/4M and consider any ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < ǫ.
By (6), for the ǫ-perturbed mean payoff game there exist positional strategies σ∗ and τ∗ such
that
ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ
∗, σ) ≤ ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ
∗, σ∗) ≤ ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ, σ
∗)
for all (not necessarily positional) strategies σ and τ . Let σ be any strategy for player Max
and assume that ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ
∗, σ) = a + ǫb and ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ
∗, σ∗) = χj + ǫκj . If a = χj ,
we have b ≤ κj because a + ǫb ≤ χj + ǫκj. Otherwise (i.e., if a 6= χj), since |b|, |κj | ≤ 2M ,
|a − χj| ≥ δ, ǫ < ǫ = δ/4M , and a + ǫb ≤ χj + ǫκj , it follows that a < χj . Therefore, we
conclude that ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ) = (a, b) ≤lex (χj , κj) = ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ∗). The same argument shows
that ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ∗) ≤lex ΦA,B(j, τ, σ
∗) for any strategy τ for player Min. This proves that the
finite duration version of the mean payoff game over germs has a value, given by (χj , κj), and that
positional optimal strategies for the ǫ-perturbed mean payoff game (with ǫ < ǫ) are also optimal
for the game over germs.
Assume now that σ∗ and τ∗ are positional optimal strategies for the finite duration version of the
mean payoff game over germs, and let (χj, κj) be its value. Then, ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ) ≤lex (χj , κj) ≤lex
ΦA,B(j, τ, σ
∗) for all strategies σ and τ (not necessarily positional).
Let σ be any strategy for player Max and assume that ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ) = (a, b). If a = χj , we
conclude b ≤ κj because ΦA,B(j, τ
∗, σ) ≤lex (χj, κj), and thus ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ
∗, σ) = a+ǫb ≤ χj+ǫκj
for any ǫ ≥ 0. Suppose now that a < χj. Since |b|, |κj | ≤ 2M and χj − a ≥ δ, it follows that
ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ
∗, σ) = a + ǫb ≤ χj + ǫκj for any ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < ǫ. The same argument shows
that ΦA(ǫ),B(ǫ)(j, τ, σ
∗) ≥ χj + ǫκj for any strategy τ for player Min and any ǫ such that 0 < ǫ < ǫ.
Therefore, we conclude that σ∗ and τ∗ are positional optimal strategies for the ǫ-perturbed mean
payoff game and that its value is χj + ǫκj . This proves the claim. 
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Figure 5. The minimization problem of Example 2: the tropical polyhedron and
the spectral function.
Remark 12. Proposition 20 opens the way to using mean payoff games over germs in order to find
right or left optimal strategies in the Newton methods. In that case, note that the second component
of all finite weights must be set to 0 except for the arcs connecting node m+1 of Max with nodes of
Min, where it is set to 1 (for right optimality) or to −1 (for left optimality). This raises the issue
of developing a direct combinatorial algorithm to solve mean payoff games over germs. Such an
algorithm would avoid the perturbation technique of the previous subsection. This will be discussed
elsewhere.
Example 5. By Proposition 20, in Example 3 we could find a left optimal strategy σ for player Max
at λk−1 = 0 computing an optimal strategy for the mean payoff game over germs whose matrices of
payments are:

(−3, 0) (−4, 0) −∞G −∞G
(−1, 0) −∞G −∞G (1, 0)
−∞G −∞G −∞G (0, 0)
(1, 0) −∞G (0, 0) −∞G
−∞G (0, 0) −∞G −∞G

 and


−∞G −∞G −∞G (0, 0)
−∞G (0, 0) −∞G −∞G
(0, 0) −∞G −∞G −∞G
(0, 0) −∞G −∞G (3, 0)
(3,−1) −∞G −∞G −∞G

 ,
where −∞G := (−∞,−∞).
Remark 13. Proposition 20 extends (6) to germs. Note that this equation provides a very crude
algorithm for computing values and optimal strategies. Further idea is to allow more general algo-
rithms, showing that they can be applied to mean payoff games over germs. This will be investigated
elsewhere.
4. Examples
4.1. Minimization. We next apply the positive Newton method to the minimization problem
of Example 2. Recall that the equivalent homogeneous version of this problem is to minimize λ
subject to uy ≤ λ + vy, Cy ≤ Dy, and y3 6= −∞, with C = [A, c], D = [B, d], u = (2,−4,−∞)
and v = (−∞,−∞, 0), where the matrices A,B and the vectors c, d are given in Example 2 (also
recall that in this example, m = 7 and n = 2). Note that in this case, for any strategy σ for player
Max, the only possible value for l := σ(m + 1) = σ(8) is n + 1 = 3. Then, at each iteration k of
the positive Newton method applied to this problem, in order to compute λk + vl = λk we need to
minimize (2 + y1) ∨ (−4 + y2) subject to the system obtained by setting y3 = 0 in Cy ≤ D
σy, as
explained in Subsection 3.5. The latter is Problem (35) for this particular case.
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Figure 6. The maximization problem of Example 1: the tropical polyhedron and
the spectral function.
We start the positive Newton method with λ0 = 15, where φ(λ0) = 5.5. The function σ(1) = 1,
σ(2) = 1, . . . , σ(7) = 1 and σ(8) = 3 is an optimal strategy for player Max at λ0. To perform the
first Newton iteration, we find the minimal solution of the system
0 ≤ x1 − 2 , 0 ≤ x1 , 0 ≤ 1 + x1 , x2 − 4 ≤ x1 ,
(x2 − 3) ∨ 0 ≤ x1 + 2 , x2 − 3 ≤ x1 , x2 − 2 ≤ x1 ,
which is (x1, x2) = (2,−∞). The next value is λ1 = (2 + x1) ∨ (−4 + x2) = 4. Then, φ(λ1) = 1.5
and σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 1, σ(5) = 1, σ(6) = 3, σ(7) = 3 and σ(8) = 3 is a new
optimal strategy for player Max. For the next Newton iteration, we find the minimal solution of
the system
0 ≤ x2 , 0 ≤ x2 − 1 , 0 ≤ 1 + x1 , x2 − 4 ≤ x1 ,
(x2 − 3) ∨ 0 ≤ x1 + 2 , x2 − 5 ≤ 0 , x2 − 6 ≤ 0 ,
which is (x1, x2) = (−1, 1). Then, the next value is λ2 = (2+x1)∨ (−4+x2) = 1. Now φ(λ2) = 0.5
and σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 2, σ(3) = 2, σ(4) = 1, σ(5) = 3, σ(6) = 3, σ(7) = 3 and σ(8) = 3 is the
optimal strategy for player Max. For the next Newton iteration, we find the minimal solution of
the system
0 ≤ x2 , 0 ≤ x2 − 1 , 0 ≤ x2 − 2 , (x2 − 3) ∨ 0 ≤ x1 + 2 ,
x2 − 4 ≤ 0 , x2 − 5 ≤ 0 , x2 − 6 ≤ 0 ,
which is (x1, x2) = (−2, 2). This gives λ3 = (2 + x1) ∨ (−4 + x2) = 0, which is the optimal value
λ∗. The optimality of λ∗ = 0 can be certified applying Theorem 12, see Example 2 above.
The vectors (2,−∞), (−1, 1) and (−2, 2) found by the Newton iterations are indicated on the
left-hand side of Figure 5 as “1”, “2” and “3”.
The right-hand side of Figure 5 displays the graph of φ(λ), together with the Newton iterations.
The graphs of partial spectral functions φσ(λ) are given by red dashed lines.
4.2. Maximization. Consider the maximization problem of Example 1. We next apply the posi-
tive Newton method to the homogeneous version (29) of the equivalent minimization problem.
With this aim, firstly observe that in this case n+1 = 3 ∈ supp(u) = {3}, and so Condition (33)
is always satisfied. Therefore, as explained in Subsection 3.5, at each iteration of the positive
Newton method applied to this problem, λk + vl can be computed by minimizing y3 subject to the
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Figure 7. Number of iterations of Newton method (thin blue line) and bisection
method (thin red line) in the cases of minimization (left) and maximization (right).
Thick blue line: average number of iterations of Newton method for each interval of
20 dimensions. Thick red line: level log(2M) ≈ 10.
system obtained by setting yl = 0 in Cy ≤ D
σy, which corresponds to Problem (35) in the case of
this example.
Let us take λ0 = 3. Then, we obtain that σ(1) = 3, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) = 3, σ(4) = 3 and σ(5) = 2
is an optimal strategy for player Max at λ0. To perform the Newton iteration we first notice that
l = σ(m+ 1) = σ(5) = 2, which means that λ1 + v2 = λ1 + 3 is the minimum of y3 subject to the
system obtained by setting y2 = 0 in Cy ≤ D
σy, as explained above. Thus, we have to find the
minimal solution of the following system:
x3 ≥ −1 , x3 ≥ (−2 + x1) ∨ (−2) , x3 ≥ −1 + x1 , x3 ≥ x1 ,
which is (x1, x3) = (−∞,−1). The full vector y = (−∞, 0,−1) is a translate of y + 1 = (x1, x2, 0),
where (x1, x2) = (−∞, 1) is marked as “1” at the left of Figure 6. Meanwhile we obtain λ1 =
x3 − 3 = −4, and σ(1) = 1, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) = 2, σ(4) = 2 and σ(5) = 2 is now a new optimal
strategy for player Max. Again, here l = σ(m+1) = σ(5) = 2 and so the second columns of C and
Dσ are the free terms in (35). We have to find the minimal solution of the following system:
x1 ≥ −1 , x3 ≥ (−2 + x1) ∨ (−2) , 0 ≥ −1 + x1 , 2 ≥ x1 ,
which is (x1, x3) = (−1,−2). We obtain λ2 = x3 − 3 = −5, which is the optimal value, and so the
value of the original maximization problem is 5. The full vector y = (−1, 0,−2) is a translate of
y + 2 = (x1, x2, 0), where (x1, x2) = (1, 2) is marked as “2” at the left of Figure 6.
As in the case of Figure 5, the right-hand side of Figure 6 displays the graph of φ(λ), together
with the Newton iterations. The graphs of partial spectral functions φσ(λ) are given by red dashed
lines.
4.3. Numerical experiments. A preliminary implementation of the bisection and Newton meth-
ods for tropical linear-fractional programming was developed in MATLAB. We next present some
graphs showing how they behave on randomly generated instances of tropical linear-fractional pro-
gramming problems, in which the entries of matrices and vectors range from −500 to 500. The
matrices A and B in (28) and (26) are square, with dimensions ranging from 1 to 400.
Figure 7 displays the cases of the tropical linear programming (28), in which all the entries are
finite. Here the certificates of unboundedness reduce to the solvability of a two-sided tropical system
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Figure 8. Number of iterations of Newton method (thin blue line) and bisection
method (thin red line) in the case of minimization withM = 500000. Thick blue line:
average number of iterations of Newton method for each interval of 20 dimensions.
Thick red line: level log(2M)− 1 ≈ 19.
of inequalities. When a feasible and bounded problem is generated, it is solved by the bisection
and Newton methods.
For the bisection method, we use the lower initial values λ0 of [BA08], see also Remark 10.
Following [BA08], the upper initial values λ0 for the bisection method come from a solution of
Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d. To find this solution, we use the policy iteration of [DG06] instead of the
alternating method of [CGB03]. Shown by the thin red line (up to m = n = 250), the bisection
method worked similarly in the case of minimization and maximization. In our experiments, the
interval between lower and upper initial values never exceeded 2M = 1000, with the number of
iterations quickly approaching a constant level of 9 or 10 iterations (logM ≈ 9 or log 2M ≈ 10).
The thin blue line represents the run of Newton method, and the thick blue line represents their
average number calculated for each interval of 20 dimensions. For the sake of fair comparison with
the bisection method, the initial value λ0 coincides with the upper initial value λ0 for the bisection
method. This value comes from a solution of Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d, instead of the theoretical value
2M(n+1), which depends on n and may be much greater. In the case of minimization, the average
number of Newton iterations slowly grows, being smaller than 10 before n ≈ 250, but exceeding
10 at larger dimensions. Naturally, the number of iterations for the same dimension may be very
different, depending on the configuration and complexity of the tropical polytopes (i.e., the solution
sets of Ax ∨ c ≤ Bx ∨ d). In the case of maximization, the number of iterations is usually below
5. Note that maximization is resolved immediately if we find the greatest point of the solution set,
which suggests that the maximization problem may be simpler. We also remark that there is no
correlation between the number of iterations of the bisection and Newton methods. In particular,
it is easy to construct instances with large integers in which the number of bisection iterations
becomes arbitrarily large, whereas the number of Newton iterations remains bounded. This agrees
with Figure 8, where in comparison to the graph on the left-hand side of Figure 7, M is equal to
500000 instead of 500.
Figure 9 displays the cases of tropical linear-fractional programming (26) with all entries finite
(right) and with a 0.7 frequency of −∞ entries (left). In the case of −∞ entries, as required by
Assumptions 1 and 2, we ensure that the set of constraints contains neither −∞ rows on the right-
hand side nor −∞ columns on the left-hand side. The case of tropical linear-fractional programming
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Figure 9. Number of iterations of Newton method (thin blue line) and bisection
method (thin red line) in the cases of linear-fractional programming with finite
entries (right) and when the average proportion of −∞ entries is 0.7 (left). Thick
blue line: average number of iterations of Newton method for each interval of 20
dimensions. Red line on the left: level log(2M) ≈ 10.
with finite entries shows almost the same picture as in the case of minimization above. The case
when −∞ appears with a regular frequency is even more favorable for Newton method, due to the
sparsity of G.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an algorithm to solve tropical linear-fractional programming prob-
lems. This is motivated by the works [AGG08] and [All09], in which disjunctive invariants of
programs are computed by tropical methods: tropical linear-fractional programming problems are
needed to tropicalize the method of templates introduced by Sankaranarayanan, Colon, Sipma and
Manna [SSM05, SCSM06].
The main technical ingredient, which combines ideas appearing in [AGG09, AGK11b, GS10] is
to introduce a parametric zero-sum two-player game (in which the payments depend on a scalar
variable), in such a way that the value of the initial tropical linear-fractional programming problem
coincides with the smallest value of the variable for which the game is winning for one of the players.
The value of the parametric game, which we call the spectral function, is a piecewise affine function
of the variable. Then, the problem is reduced to finding the smallest zero of the spectral function,
which we do by a Newton-type algorithm, in which at each iteration, we solve a one-player auxiliary
game.
Using this game-theoretic connection, we present concise certificates expressed in terms of the
strategies of both players, allowing one to check whether a given feasible solution is optimal,
or whether the tropical linear-fractional programming problem is unbounded. This is inspired
by [AGK11b], in which certificates of the same nature were given for the simpler problem of
certifying whether a tropical linear inequality is a logical consequence of a finite family of such
inequalities.
We also develop a generalization of the bisection method of [BA08]. The latter, as well as Newton
method, are shown to be pseudo-polynomial. Note that at each iteration, both methods call an
oracle solving a mean payoff game problem (for which the existence of a polynomial time algorithm
is an open question - only pseudo-polynomial algorithms are known). The pseudo-polynomial
bound that we give for Newton method is worse than the one concerning the bisection method,
however, for the former we also give a non pseudo-polynomial bound, involving the number of
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strategies, which is better than the pseudo-polynomial bound if the integers of the instance are
very large. This is confirmed by experiments, with a preliminary implementation, which indicates
that Newton method scales better as the size of the integers grows. In addition, it has the advantage
of maintaining feasibility, and there are significant special instances in which it converges in very
few iterations.
The Newton method of this paper appears as a natural product of the game-theoretic connection
and the spectral function approach. We further concentrate on the implementation of each Newton
step by reduction to optimal path algorithms, and on the proof of pseudo-polynomiality. This
method could be also considered in the framework of more abstract Newton methods in a generalized
domain, which also means making decent comparison with other Newton schemes, like [EGKS08].
The comparison of Newton and bisection methods, as well as possible alternative approaches, also
remain to be further examined.
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